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Abstract
This paper presents a general result for simultaneous reform of tari⁄s and quotas in a small open economy,
where some of the quota rents do not accrue to domestic residents. Absent highly perverse income e⁄ects,
welfare must rise following a uniform proportionate reduction in tari⁄s and a uniform proportionate relaxation
of quotas, weighted by their rent-retention parameters. Previous results are shown to be special cases of this
one, and its implications for practical policy advice and its relationship with the policy of ￿tari¢ cation￿of
quotas are noted.
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The theory of piecemeal policy reform seeks rules of thumb for small policy changes which will guarantee an
improvement in welfare, even when little detailed information on the structure of the economy is available.
For changes in trade policy, the best-known result of this kind, associated with Foster and Sonnenschein
(1970), Bruno (1972) and Hatta (1977a), is that welfare must rise if all tari⁄s are reduced by the same
proportion.1 Falvey (1988) showed that this result also holds in the presence of ￿pure￿quotas, where all the
quota rents accrue to domestic residents.2 However, most real-world quantitative restrictions imply some
loss of rents, typically mid-way between pure quotas and voluntary export restraints (VER￿ s) where all rents
accrue to foreign exporters and so are lost to the domestic economy. The theory has been extended to
take account of such mixed cases by Anderson and Neary (1992), but they did not present any results for
simultaneous reform of tari⁄s and quotas.
This paper extends the theory of trade liberalization to derive a general result for simultaneous reform
of all trade policies, when trade is distorted by quotas as well as tari⁄s and when quota-constrained imports
di⁄er in the share of rents retained by the importing country. Crucially, the result does not require any special
assumptions about the structure of the economy. An alternative tradition derives results which hold under
reasonable but nevertheless demanding restrictions on tastes and technology, for example, that some or all
goods are general-equilibrium substitutes, as in Hatta (1977b) and Falvey (1988), or that tari⁄-constrained
and quota-constrained goods are implicitly separable as in Anderson and Neary (1992). Though these results
are of independent interest, it is clearly very desirable to ￿nd results which hold more generally.
Section 2 reviews the approach to modelling aggregate behaviour in the presence of tari⁄s and quotas
developed in Anderson and Neary (1992). Section 3 presents the model of the economy and derives expres-
sions for the marginal welfare e⁄ects of changes in tari⁄s and quotas which generalise those of Anderson
and Neary (1992). These properties are then used in Section 4 to derive the main result of the paper. This
section also explains the intuitive basis for the result, shows that it nests many previous reform rules in the
literature, and relates it to the policy of ￿tari¢ cation￿of quotas which was implemented in the Uruguay
Round of trade liberalisation.
1Foster and Sonnenschein provided the ￿rst formal proof in the multi-commodity case, assuming that all goods are normal;
Bruno showed that this assumption could be replaced by the much weaker assumption that the shadow price of foreign exchange
is positive (see Section 3 below for details); and Hatta (1977a) provided a simple proof using the expenditure function.
2Other papers which extend the theory of trade liberalization to take account of quotas (or of non-traded goods, which
are formally equivalent to prohibitive quotas), include Hatta (1977b), Fukushima (1979) and Corden and Falvey (1985). The
presentation here draws mostly on Anderson and Neary (1992) and Neary (1995). See also Lahiri and Raimondos (1996).
12 Modelling Behaviour in the Presence of Tari⁄s and Quotas
Consider a competitive small open economy, in which some imports are subject to tari⁄s and others are
subject to quotas. Imports of tari⁄-constrained goods are denoted by m, with domestic and world prices ￿
and ￿￿ respectively, which di⁄er because of speci￿c tari⁄s t, so ￿ = ￿￿ + t. Imports of quota-constrained
goods are denoted by q, with domestic and world prices p and p￿ respectively. It will be convenient to refer to
the two groups of goods as the ￿t-goods￿and the ￿q-goods￿ , respectively. Finally, exports and unconstrained
imports can be grouped together as a composite numeraire good, with net imports m0. The price of the
numeraire, which is the same at home and abroad, is set equal to one (and omitted from the list of arguments
of the behavioral functions for convenience).
Consider ￿rst the benchmark case where the q-goods are not subject to binding quotas. The behavior of
the economy is then most conveniently summarized by the trade expenditure function. With two categories
of goods this is de￿ned as:
E(￿;p;u) ￿ e(￿;p;u) ￿ g(￿;p); (1)
where e(￿;p;u) and g(￿;p) are the household expenditure and GDP functions respectively. By Shepherd￿ s
Lemma, the price derivatives of the trade expenditure function give the compensated net import demand
functions for the t- and q-goods which apply in the absence of quotas:
E￿(￿;p;u) = mc(￿;p;u): (2)
Ep(￿;p;u) = qc(￿;p;u) (3)
Since the trade expenditure function is concave in f￿;pg, each of these import demand functions is non-
increasing in its own price. For convenience we will assume that they are strictly decreasing in their own
price, and, more generally, that the matrices E￿￿ and Epp are negative de￿nite.3 The trade expenditure
function may also be de￿ned in an alternative way which will prove useful below:
E(￿;p;u) ￿ min
m0;m;q[m0 + ￿0m + p0q : U(m0;m;q) = u]; (4)
where U(m0;m;q) is a Meade trade utility function de￿ned over net imports m0, m and q rather than ￿nal
consumption.4
3This requires some substitutability in excess demand between the di⁄erent groups of goods. I make this mild assumption
throughout, without repeating the quali￿cation.
4See Chipman (1979) and Woodland (1980) for further details.
2When the q-goods are restricted by binding quotas we need to adopt a di⁄erent approach. Following
Anderson and Neary (1992), we therefore introduce a new function, the distorted trade expenditure function.
This equals net spending on the tari⁄-constrained goods conditional on the quota levels:
~ E(￿;q;u) ￿ min
m0;m
[m0 + ￿0m : U(m0;m;q) = u]: (5)
Viewed as a function of ￿ and u for given q, the distorted trade expenditure function behaves just like the
standard trade expenditure function. The derivative of ~ E with respect to u is the marginal cost of utility
eu, and, invoking Shepherd￿ s Lemma once again, its derivatives with respect to ￿ equal the compensated
import demand functions for the t-goods conditional on the quotas:
~ E￿(￿;q;u) = ~ mc(￿;q;u): (6)
These quota-constrained demand functions have properties with respect to ￿ similar to those of the uncon-
strained demand functions (2). In particular:
Lemma 1: ~ E is concave in ￿, and so the matrix of own-price derivatives of the quota-constrained demand
functions for the t-goods, e mc
￿, which equals ~ E￿￿, is negative de￿nite.
Heuristically, the compensated net import demand functions for the t-goods slope downwards.
What about the properties of the distorted trade expenditure function as a function of the quota con-
straints? To derive these, note that the distorted and undistorted functions can be related provided the
domestic prices of the quota-constrained goods are market-clearing.5 More precisely:
~ E(￿;q;u) = E[￿;p(￿;q;u);u] ￿ p(￿;q;u)0q (7)
where the market-clearing price vector p is de￿ned implicitly by:
q = Ep(￿;p;u): (8)
Di⁄erentiating (7) with respect to q and using (8) to simplify gives an explicit expression for the prices p:
p(￿;q;u) = ￿ ~ Eq(￿;q;u): (9)
Thus the derivatives of the distorted trade expenditure function with respect to the quota levels equal minus
5This approach follows the analysis of household behaviour under rationing by Neary and Roberts (1980), who called p the
virtual prices of the rationed goods.
3the inverse demand functions for the quota-constrained goods, expressing their market-clearing prices as
functions of the exogenous variables. The key property of these inverse demand functions is given by the
following:
Lemma 2: ~ E is convex in q, and so the matrix of derivatives of the inverse demand functions for the
q-goods with respect to the quota levels, pq, which equals ￿ ~ Eqq, is negative de￿nite.
(See Anderson and Neary (1992) for a formal proof.) Heuristically, the compensated inverse demand
functions for the q-goods slope downwards.
3 The Welfare E⁄ects of Changes in Trade Policy
The distorted trade expenditure function summarizes the behaviour of the private sector and it only remains
to specify public sector behaviour, which is purely redistributive. It is standard to assume that all tari⁄
revenue is redistributed in a lump-sum manner to the aggregate household. However, the same assumption
is not plausible in the case of quota rents. Instead, we assume that a fraction !j of the quota rents on each
good j is lost to the domestic economy. As noted in the Introduction, !j is zero in the case of a pure quota
and one in the case of a VER. Total quota rents retained at home and redistributed to households therefore
equal ￿j(1￿!j)(pj ￿p￿
j)qj. In matrix form this can be written as (p￿p￿)0(I ￿!)q, where I is the identity
matrix and a bar under a vector denotes the corresponding diagonal matrix (so ! is a diagonal matrix with
the rent-loss shares on the principal diagonal).
Armed with the properties of the distorted trade expenditure function and our assumptions about the
disposition of quota rents, we are now ready to specify the general equilibrium of the economy. In equi-
librium, net expenditure on the numeraire and on tari⁄-constrained goods (5), plus net expenditure on
quota-constrained goods p0q, must equal tari⁄ revenue t0m plus retained quota rents (p ￿ p￿)0(I ￿ !)q:
~ E(￿;q;u) + p0q = t0m + (p ￿ p￿)0(I ￿ !)q: (10)
The ￿rst step toward deriving the welfare e⁄ects of trade policy reform is to totally di⁄erentiate equation
(10). (We simplify by using (6), (9) and the fact that d￿ = dt. We also assume for the present that the
rent-loss parameters ! are constant, so we ignore terms in d!.) This yields:
eudu = t0dm + (p ￿ p￿)0(I ￿ !)dq ￿ q0!dp: (11)
This equation does not give the full e⁄ect of changes in trade policy, because the terms in dm and dp are
4endogenous. Nevertheless, it is very helpful in providing intuition. Consider in turn the three terms on the
right-hand side. The ￿rst shows that, as in standard models where tari⁄s are the only distortion, welfare
rises if the tari⁄-weighted volume of tari⁄-constrained imports increases, or, equivalently, if tari⁄ revenue
rises at the initial tari⁄s. The second shows that, other things equal, welfare rises when quotas are relaxed
(except for VER￿ s where !i = 1, so all the rents are lost). Finally, the third term shows that welfare also
rises when the domestic prices of quota-constrained goods fall, since (except for pure quotas where !i = 0)
this reduces total rents and hence reduces the amount transferred to foreigners.
The next step is to use the di⁄erentials of (6) and (9) to eliminate the endogenous terms dm and dp from
(11). This yields the basic equation for the welfare e⁄ects of changes in trade policy in the presence of tari⁄s
and quotas:
￿￿1eudu = ￿0dt + ￿0dq: (12)
As in Anderson and Neary (1992), the coe¢ cient of the change in real income eudu can be interpreted as the
inverse of the shadow price of foreign exchange, ￿, which measures the e⁄ect on welfare of a unit transfer of
the numeraire good. Writing it in full:6
￿ ￿
1
1 ￿ t0 ~ mI + q0!pI
: (13)
Any increase in real income has a multiplier e⁄ect which is greater than one to the extent that it raises
demand for tari⁄-constrained imports. O⁄setting this, when the rent-loss parameters !i are strictly positive,
the multiplier e⁄ect is dampened to the extent that incipient increases in demand for quota-constrained
goods push up their domestic prices and so increase the amount of rents lost. Because of the combined e⁄ect
of these in￿ uences, ￿ may be either greater or less than unity. In any case, we assume throughout that it is
positive.7
The welfare e⁄ect of trade reform, or the marginal cost of protection, therefore depends on the coe¢ cients
of changes in the policy variables in (12), which we call the marginal costs of tari⁄s:
￿0 = t0 ~ mc
￿ ￿ q0!p￿ (14)
6To derive this we express the cross-derivatives of ~ E with respect to prices and utility in terms of the derivatives of the
distorted Marshallian import demand and virtual price functions with respect to income: ~ E￿u = ~ mIeu and ~ Equ = ￿pIeu.
7This may be rationalised on stability grounds or by invoking a minimal degree of rationality of government policy. Alterna-
tively, we can look for su¢ cient conditions to sign the individual terms. The term in ￿ which does not appear in the absence of
quotas is q0!pI. This can be shown to equal ￿q0!E￿1
pp qI. Alternative su¢ cient conditions for this to be positive are: (a) from
Hatta (1977a), that the q-goods are normal in demand and net substitutes; and (b) from Anderson and Neary (1992), that !i
is the same for all goods and that the q-goods are homothetic in demand and have uniform import shares (so that qI = ￿q=I,
where ￿ is the common import share).
5and the shadow prices of quotas respectively:
￿0 = t0 ~ mc
q + (p ￿ p￿)0(I ￿ !) ￿ q0!pq (15)
These formulae generalise the results of Anderson and Neary (1992) to allow for rent-loss parameters which
di⁄er across commodities. They are the central equations of the paper.
4 Simultaneous Trade Policy Reform
As explained in the introduction, we seek a rule for simultaneous changes in tari⁄s and quotas which guar-
antees a welfare improvement without the need to place restrictions on the structure of the economy. It
transpires that such a rule can be devised by combining two results already in the literature. The ￿rst is the
radial reduction in tari⁄s result, discussed in the introduction. The second is a result due to Anderson and
Neary (1992), who showed that, in the absence of tari⁄s, welfare must rise following a uniform relaxation of
quotas weighted by their rent-loss parameters.8 Combining these results, provided both sets of distortions
are relaxed at the same rate, a welfare improvement is assured.
We ￿rst state the new result formally:
Proposition 1: Assume that the shadow price of foreign exchange is positive. Then a uniform proportion-
ate reduction of tari⁄s combined with a uniform proportionate relaxation of quotas, weighted by the share
of rents lost on each quota-constrained good, with both proportionate changes at the same rate, must raise
welfare.
Proof : The policy rule implies that dt = ￿td￿ and dq = !qd￿, where d￿ is a positive scalar. Substituting




= ￿￿0t + ￿0!q
= ￿t0 ~ mc
￿t + (p ￿ p￿)0(I ￿ !)!q ￿ q0!pq!q (16)
All three terms on the right-hand side of this expression are positive scalars, the second because all its
individual terms are positive, and the ￿rst and third because they are minus quadratic forms in negative
de￿nite matrices, from Lemmas 1 and 2 respectively. Hence a welfare gain is guaranteed.
8See Theorem 20 of Anderson and Neary (1992), p. 68.
6Q.E.D.
While the proposition is not di¢ cult to prove, providing intuition for it is more of a challenge. One
approach to doing this is mathematical. Recall from Lemmas 1 and 2 that the function e E is concave in ￿
(and hence, for given world prices, in t) and convex in q. This implies that the second-derivative matrices
e E￿￿ and e Eqq are negative de￿nite and positive de￿nite respectively. Hence the expressions t0 e E￿￿dt and
q0! e Eqqdq are both positive when dt = ￿td￿ and dq = !qd￿, since they are quadratic forms in the positive
de￿nite matrices ￿ e E￿￿ and e Eqq. Lemma 3 in the Appendix shows that this result can be extended to prove
that for such a function the expression x0 e Exxdx is also a positive quadratic form, where x is a vector formed
by stacking the two vectors t and !q, and dx is such that dt = ￿td￿ and dq = !qd￿.
To appreciate the economics underlying the proposition, consider the individual terms on the right-hand
side of (16). From equation (11), the second term re￿ ects the e⁄ects of the quota relaxation at given import
volumes m and domestic prices p. Fixing m and p in this way rules out second-best complications, so
any quota reform must raise welfare since it reduces the amount of rents lost. A quota reform of the type
dq = !qd￿ must strictly raise welfare provided that not all quotas have either zero (!i = 0) or full (!i = 1)
rent loss.
As for the ￿rst and third terms on the right-hand side of (16), these re￿ ect the direct e⁄ects of the tari⁄
and quota reforms. The ￿rst term, ￿t0 ~ mc
￿t, re￿ ects the welfare gain arising from the increase in imports of
the t-goods following a uniform proportionate reduction in tari⁄s. The third term, ￿q0!pq!q, re￿ ects the
welfare gain arising from the reduction in domestic prices p of the q-goods (with a consequent fall in rents
lost) following a uniform proportionate relaxation of !-weighted quotas. The fact that these direct e⁄ects
on welfare are unambiguously positive is well-established in the literature.9
The trade reforms also have indirect e⁄ects, which might be expected to render their net impact on
welfare ambiguous. These indirect e⁄ects are captured by two additional terms (not shown in equation
(16)) which appear in the full expression for du, and which are indeterminate in sign : t0 e mc
q!q and q0!p￿t.
However, these two scalars cancel, because e mc
q (which equals e E￿q) is the transpose of ￿p￿ (which equals
e Eq￿). In words, the e⁄ect of the uniform quota relaxation on tari⁄ revenue is exactly equal to the e⁄ect of
the uniform tari⁄ reduction on lost quota rents. Crucial for this result is the assumption that both types of
trade distortion are relaxed at the same rate. As a result the indirect e⁄ects play no role and the net e⁄ect
of the trade reform on welfare is unambiguously positive.
9Hatta (1977b) and Fukushima (1979) showed that a uniform proportionate reduction in tari⁄s must raise welfare in the
presence of non-traded goods, provided all goods are net substitutes. Falvey (1988) extended this result to tari⁄ reductions in
the presence of quotas with full retention, and Neary (1995) showed that the quali￿cation of net substitutability is unnecessary.
As for a uniform proportionate relaxation of !-weighted quotas, Anderson and Neary (1992) showed that this must raise welfare
in the absence of tari⁄s.
7It is clear that Proposition 1 encompasses as special cases all the results already in the literature for
uniform proportionate relaxations of trade distortions in a small open economy.10 This is true of the results
of Hatta (1977a), Falvey (1988) and Neary (1995) that a uniform proportionate reduction in tari⁄s raises
welfare either when quotas are absent or when all quota rents are retained. It is also true of the result
of Anderson and Neary (1992) that, in the absence of tari⁄s, a uniform proportionate relaxation of quotas
raises welfare with partial rent retention.11 All these results are corollaries of Proposition 1 since they apply
only in special cases when one set of trade policy instruments is either absent (no tari⁄s in the case of quota
relaxations only) or benign (full rent retention in the case of tari⁄ reductions only).
Finally, Proposition 1 highlights the importance in trade policy reform of taking account of the rents lost
to the domestic economy. While some authors have argued that this consideration also applies to tari⁄s (see
in particular the discussion of ￿revenue seeking￿by Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980)), it seems most serious
in the case of quotas. This suggests that the model should have implications for the issue of ￿tari¢ cation￿ :
abolishing quantitative restrictions and replacing them by their equivalent quotas. This policy switch was
applied to agricultural trade in the Uruguay Round for example. In the present model, it is equivalent to a
combination of two policies: ￿rst, a switch from the economy described by equation (10) where behaviour is
summarised in terms of the distorted trade expenditure function to an otherwise identical economy expressed
in terms of the undistorted trade expenditure function (1); and second, a reduction in the rent-loss parameters
!. The ￿rst change is neutral in itself. To see the e⁄ects of the second, we can ￿rst return to equation (10)
and totally di⁄erentiate it with respect to !, which yields
￿￿1eudu = ￿(p ￿ p￿)
0 qd! (17)
The right-hand side is positive provided d! is negative. Reducing the rent-loss parameters in any way (not
necessarily proportionally) thus unambiguously lowers the amount of rents lost and raises welfare. After the
tari¢ cation process is carried out, so it is q rather than p which adjusts, the welfare e⁄ect of changes in
! is also given by (17), except that the shadow price of foreign exchange takes a slightly di⁄erent form.12
Thus tari¢ cation of quotas, to the extent that it reduces infra-marginal rent loss, is unambiguously welfare-
improving.
10Of course, it does not deal with the case of unilateral reform of tari⁄s and quotas in a large economy, as in Neary (1995),
nor with that of multilateral reforms of tari⁄s and quotas by a group of countries as in Woodland and Turunen-Red (2000).
11Strictly speaking, Proposition 1 does not nest the result of Corden and Falvey (1985), whereby welfare is raised by any
quota reduction provided all rents are retained and there are no tari⁄s. In such a case the rule dq = !qd￿ is clearly degenerate,
since !i is zero for all i. As Corden and Falvey showed in this case, for arbitrary positive dq the change in welfare is proportional
to (p ￿ p￿)0dq and so is positive.
12Di⁄erentiating (10) with the left-hand side equal to the undistorted trade expenditure function (1) and with m and q
determined by (2) and (3) respectively, yields: (￿0)
￿1 eudu = ￿(p ￿ p￿)0qd!, where ￿0 =
￿
1 ￿ t0mI ￿ (p ￿ p￿)0 (I ￿ !)qI
￿￿1.
85 Conclusion
This paper has presented a new result on simultaneous reform of tari⁄s and quotas in a distorted small open
economy. The policy rule whose e¢ cacy is established in Proposition 1 involves a uniform proportionate
relaxation of all distortions. It is convenient for practical advice, if somewhat surprising, that both tari⁄s
and quotas should be relaxed at the same rate, even though they are measured in di⁄erent units. It is also
intuitively plausible that the quotas which should be relaxed fastest are those which lose the most rent for
the domestic economy. Combining these policy reform rules ensures that second-best problems are avoided
and a welfare gain is assured.
As far as the practical applicability of the trade reform rule in Proposition 1 is concerned, it clearly requires
that all trade policy instruments can be altered at once. On the other hand, it has minimal informational
requirements: no parameters of the home economy need be known, and the only assumption which must be
made is to rule out interactions between initial distortions and income e⁄ects which are su¢ ciently perverse
that the shadow price of foreign exchange is negative. Though unlikely to be directly applicable in any
particular application, the result hopefully provides a benchmark with which actual liberalisation plans
(whether in a unilateral or multilateral context) can be compared.
9Appendix
As noted in the text, the formal underpinnings of Proposition 1 can be expressed as follows.



















Suppose that F is strictly concave in x1 and strictly convex in x2. Then, the expression x0Fxxy is strictly
positive.













2F22x2 > 0 (19)
In the last line, x0
1F11x1 is negative because F is strictly concave in x1 and x0
2F22x2 is positive because F is
strictly convex in x2. Hence the whole expression is strictly positive.
Q.E.D.
Note that Lemma 3 does not yield Proposition 1 immediately. It can be checked that much of the
expression for du in (16) can be written as x0Fxxdx, where dx1 = ￿x1d￿ and dx2 = x2d￿, representing a
uniform proportionate decrease in x1 and a uniform proportionate increase in x2 at the same rate. Lemma 3
then applies directly. However, there is an additional term in the expression for du in (16), (p￿p￿)0(I￿!)!q,
which is not covered by the Lemma. Fortunately, since all the elements of this term are individually positive,
it does not a⁄ect the result.
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